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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
World financial turmoil that began late in 1997 has increased signifi-
cantly interest to analysis of underlying mechanics of securities markets
performance. This issue is especially topical for Russia, where financial
crisis turned to be quite deep and comprehensive. Evidently, one of the
fundamental reasons of the crisis was globalization of financial markets
that played positive role under some conditions, but served as a multi-
plier for negative trends in the changed environment.
The study was aimed at medium-term forecasting of domestic interest
rates and creating tools to evaluate debt management strategies. Analy-
sis of the GKO market showed that 2 periods can be singled out, sepa-
rated by introduction of the "currency band" in mid-1995. Before its
introduction GKO interest rates were closely correlated to the expected
yield of investment to foreign currency. Later this correlation weakens,
and GKO interest rate is instead closely related to the currency securi-
ties yields, adjusted for the expected exchange rate growth, in line with
the parity ratio principle.
The basic model taken as a starting point suggests that GKO interest
rate depends on three factors: lagged interest rate, international interest
rate adjusted for currency expectations, and some base rate, reflecting
both macroeconomic situation and inflationary expectations. Relative
importance of these factors is interpreted as “market efficiency”,
“market integration”, and “macroeconomic dependency”. Possibility of
varying weights of these factors was also considered at the stage of
model specification.
Taking into account interdependence of all variables, the model was
constructed as a system of simultaneous equation. Monthly data on
Russian interest rates and macroeconomic indicators for the period July
1995 – October 1997 were used to estimate relationship of GKO interest
rate, interest rate for Russian currency securities, Central Bank refi-
nancing rate, and expected exchange rate (characterized by futures
quotes), as well as their dependence on real volume of domestic bor-
rowings, international reserves, and announced inflation and exchange
rate growth. The CBR rate was chosen as the base domestic interest
rate, taking into account both its role as an indicator for financial mar-
kets, and its connection to the major macroeconomic parameters. Spe-
cial dummy variables were introduced to account for risks, related to
political uncertainty before presidential elections.
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The model accuracy proved to be fairly high on historic data. The model
parameters imply that "market integration" has increased significantly
over the period (which corresponds to the growing involvement of non-
residents to Russian securities markets). It was found that market inte-
gration growth accounts for 2/3 of the observed decline in the GKO in-
terest rates from 1995 to 1997. This conclusion confirms the wide-
spread view that the interest rates decrease was primarily explained by
non-residents involvement to the market, and provides its quantitative
estimation. The model provides also estimate for the “election effect”:
start of the elections period in March resulted in the GKO yields hike by
63 percentage points, and peak of pre-election uncertainty in June was
marked with additional growth of yields by 103 percentage points.
Ex post and ex ante simulation carried out for the first and the second
half of 1998 revealed that the model fails to produce good description
of interest rates performance in the period of world financial crisis.
Model analysis evidences that primary source of model inadequacy is
poor prediction of exchange rate expectations. In reality exchange ex-
pectations have hiked due to deteriorated trade balance projections af-
ter decline in the world market commodity prices. Another reason is
changed attitudes of investors to emerging markets (including Russia)
with the initiation of the world financial crisis. Growing cautiousness in
this period contrasted capital inflow during the previous year. Finally, the
situation at the new stage was modified entirely by lack of confidence to
the money authorities policy, resulting in quite different interpretation of
the announced macroeconomic targets.
The model provides thus fair description of the major interest rates in
Russia before the world crisis, while their performance during the crisis
period deserves further analysis.
One major recommendation that can be drawn from the model analysis
is necessity for the Central Bank to be very cautious in reducing refi-
nancing rate. It should be made only after relatively long period of de-
clining GKO/OFZ interest rates. Another general conclusion is that
authorities should consider as dangerous and intolerable situation when
market expectations differ significantly from the announced targets.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The financial turmoil in world and Russian financial markets at the end of
1997 and the beginning of 1998 has increased the demand for an ex-
planation of changes in interest rates and for interest rate forecasts.
Evidently, the fluctuations in interest rates have been closely connected
with the increased integration of financial markets, which modified the
domestic responses to internal problems. Moreover, we face the ques-
tion of whether the high level of domestic interest rates prevailing in
Russia in 1997 was justified by internal economic and political risks.
Furthermore, we have to find short- and medium-term economic policy
measures that can affect fluctuations in domestic interest rates despite
a high degree of globalization. The model developed and estimated in
this paper is intended to provide answers to those questions.
There is no extensive literature on the interest rate determination in to-
day's Russia. One of a few is the working paper on GKO interest fore-
casting by P.Teplukhin and A.Warner. Their model was able to predict
interest rates in 1995 for periods up to two quarters. It is unclear
whether this model can be suitable for the purposes of medium-term
forecasting. We are familiar also with several studies relating to the
forecasting of T-bill rates in Russia, which have been or are carried out
as Master's theses in the New Economic School and the Higher School
of Economics. The authors are trying in particular to relate short-term
interest rates to basic macroeconomic indicators such as inflation,
money supply, GDP, budget deficit, domestic debt etc. They found a
clear correlation between real T-bill rates and budget deficit levels.
There is no evidence supporting strong influence of other factors on the
level of interest rates.
The borrowing strategy in the framework of macroeconomic policy is
discussed, among others, by A.Illarionov. He reviews fiscal and financial
developments in Russia during the last five years and argues that the
government has been involved too much into economic activity, and
consequently borrowed excessively from domestic markets. So, ac-
cording to A.Illarionov, the reduction of budget expenditure would be a
necessary pre-condition for the elimination of the chain of crises in Rus-
sia.
There exists a bulk of publications on the forecasting of interest rates in
other countries. Two broad categories of the literature concerning inter-
est rate forecasting can be distinguished: methodologies of interest rate
forecasting, and empirical studies.
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The first category includes forecasting models based on the theoreti-
cal models mentioned above. The Fisher's equation states that the fu-
ture nominal rate of interest is approximately equal to the sum of ex-
pected real interest rate and expected inflation. There exist quite many
models allowing to forecast real interest rates and inflation. According to
some authors (Kinal and Lahiri, 1988, etc.), the real interest rate per-
forms a random walk. They explain this behavior by the efficiency of fi-
nancial markets, which implies that the latter appropriately respond to
any new information, such as unexpectedly poor inflation or balance of
payments results. However, many analysts believe that interest rates
can only be explained in the context of a fully fledged model. The ele-
ments of such kind of model should include, in particular the wealth ef-
fect, which tends to depress the real interest rate (Mundell, 1963), and
the tax effect, which works in the opposite direction (Darby, 1975). It is
not easy to forecast the future rate of inflation too. Most models (Fama,
1975, etc.) are based on the rational expectations approach, where the
expected inflation is related to the past inflation and instrumental fac-
tors, e.g. money supply and output growth.
Another line of research has been devoted to the global explanation of
domestic interest rates (Aliber, 1973; Browne, 1983). In the efficient
world financial markets with perfect capital mobility domestic interest
rates have to be equal to the sum of the comparable-risk world interest
rate and the expected domestic currency depreciation.
There exist also the extensive literature on the modeling of T-bill auc-
tions (Smith, 1966; Sivesind, 1978).
The second category of literature includes empirical studies of nomi-
nal and real interest rate developments in various countries; and appli-
cations of theoretical models to explain these developments. Three
sources seem to be most relevant to our study. K.Gupta and
B.Moazzami (1996) have studied the relationships between interest
rates and budget deficits in advanced economies. In particular, the
authors examine the role of inflation expectations and the Fisher hy-
pothesis. They have found that cross-country generalizations can be
misleading, and country-specific factors still play a decisive role in inter-
est rate determination. S. van Wijnbergen (1983) has studied a number
of issues relating to the interest rate management in developing coun-
tries and simulated his models for South Korea. He elaborated on the
effects of interest rate changes on savings, growth and inflation and
found support for his arguments in empirical data. Finally, G. del Castillo
(1991) wrote an important paper on interest rate determination with an
active crawling peg system. He showed that the presence of political
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uncertainty contributes to the deviation of domestic interest rates from
the interest rate parity based on the announced future exchange rates.
This is, apparently, the case in Russia, so we will try to apply his results
in our research.
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2. THE DATA SET
All statistical information that we collected can be divided into 5 broad
categories: macroeconomic, monetary, budgetary, Russian financial
markets, International financial markets. In each category we tried to get
daily or monthly data series from 1992 to 1997. However, as the Rus-
sian market for government securities has been well developed only
from the middle 1994, we focus mainly on the data series from June
1994 to December 1997. Most of the statistical analysis was conducted
on a monthly basis, so we had around 40 observations for each indica-
tor.
We decided to use as announced inflation the inflation rates forecast in
the Government-CBR's Declaration on Economic Policy in the context of
IMF programs for 1995 – 1996, and given by the CBR's Guidelines of
Monetary Policy for 1997 – 1998. While in 1995 the inflation rate was
under-forecast by two-fold, in the following years the forecasts have
been quite close to reality. As the announced exchange rate in 1995, we
use the growth of the exchange rate to the upper end of the horizontal
exchange rate band. For the following years, we apply the announce-
ment about the stable real exchange rate within the exchange rate
bands.
Technically, we apply, for a given year, the announced inflation fore-
casts and exchange rate growth rates only for the first seven months of
the year, and use weighted average figures of current and next year
forecasts for the rest of each year, where the weights have been taken
according to the number of months remaining.
To estimate the expected exchange rate growth we use exchange rate
futures rates at the largest stock exchanges for that type of contracts
(Moscow Stock Exchange before 1997, and MICEX — in 1997). For each
month, we apply weighted average quotations on contracts between five
and seven months.
For the currency-denominated securities (Minfin bonds) interest rates
were extrapolated to reflect their higher maturity. Adjusted interest rates
corresponding to 6 months maturity were constructed.
All interest rates were expressed in annual terms.
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Indicator Description Objective
Macroeconomic indicators
Nominal and real GDP Monthly Goskomstat (GKS) series Basis for comparative ratio
analysis
Consumer price indices
(CPI)
Monthly CPI (GKS) Constructing real values of
financial indicators
Monetary indicators
Money base M2
(= NDA+NIR = cash + res)
Monthly CBR data Analyzing impact of money
supply
Refinancing rate CBR data Baseline domestic interest rate
Budget
Budget deficit Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Economic
Expert Group (EEG) monthly data
Analyzing government
borrowing requirements
Borrowing from
domestic markets
Monthly data of MoF and EEG on issuance
of GKO/OFZ, and receipts to the federal
budget from their placement.
Analyzing possible impact of
borrowings on interest rates
Net borrowing Monthly data of MoF and on GKO/OFZ re-
payment and federal budget net fina cing
Analyzing possible impact of
net financing on interest rates
Russian financial markets
Exchange rate
(spot and futures)
Spot (MICEX) and future (MCSE) daily
and average monthly rates
Analyzing exchange rate
expectations to compare yields
for securities in foreign and
national currencies
Interbank credit rate Monthly average MIBOR rates on 30 days
and overnight in erbank loans (CBR data)
C pturing the liquidity
constraints of the banking
sector for the analysis of GKO
market
GKO-OFZ rates Daily and average monthly GKO and OFZ
rates (MICEX and MoF data) for all types
of securities with volumes of trade; primary
and secondary markets
Constructing interest rates
model
International financial markets
Russian foreign
currency instruments
Daily data (MoF and Eurobrokers) on yields
for Russian Eurobonds (from November
1996) and MinFin bonds (from June 1994)
Analyzing interest parity
condition
US T-bills Average monthly yields for US 6 months
T-bills
Calculating and analysing
spreads for Russian currency
securities
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3. DATA ANALYSIS
As the project's main concern is the explanation of interest rate devel-
opments for domestic government securities, a significant amount of
time are devoted to the analysis of interest rate movements from 1994
to 1997.
3.1. SPECIFICATION
The Market. It is possible to use either primary or secondary auction
data on GKO yields. We have chosen primary auction data as the major
indicator on the basis of two considerations:
· the Ministry of Finance is interested primarily in primary auction rates
as the latter determine its borrowing costs rather than secondary
market developments;
· primary and secondary market rates are highly correlated over the
entire period under consideration except for November and Decem-
ber 1995; we analyze on a later stage both the primary auction pre-
mia over the secondary auction rates, and the outliers of 1995 in or-
der to complete the description.
Maturity. Taking into account that at an early stage of the development
of GKO market the Ministry of Finance has been issuing mainly very
short-term instruments (3 to 6 months), while later the maturity struc-
ture has been shifting towards 6 months and 1 – 3 years securities, we
have chosen yields on 6-month papers as a benchmark. In those cases
where there were no 6-month papers issued, we have built yield curves
and then adjusted yields available for GKOs with other maturities. An
alternative would be to use secondary auction data on the papers ma-
turing in 6 months.
The Period. As data for most indicators is available from June 1994, we
concentrated on the analysis of GKO interest rates from June 1994 to
December 1997. Earlier period is of less interest, as the government
securities markets were not mature enough.
Effective and real values. As the tax treatment of various Russian fi-
nancial instruments varies, we have considered after-tax yields of all
instruments including GKOs. The tax on GKO yields obtained by resi-
dents was introduced only in 1997. In addition, for a comparative analy-
sis we use the CPI-deflated and dollar-equivalent values of nominal in-
terest rates.
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The development of the major macroeconomic indicators is presented in
the graphs below.
3.2. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS
Our analysis confirmed that there is a close link between GKO yields in
the primary and secondary markets. This correlation over the period
from January 1995 until September 1997 for the yields for GKOs with 6-
month maturity turned to be 0.95. The regression of the secondary yield
(YS) on the primary one (YP) was significant with adjusted R2 = 0.91,
and had the form: YS = 7.3% + 0.882 YP. On average, the secondary
yields were lower than the primary ones by 6.5 percentage points.
There was only one period when these yields differed significantly: in
November and December of 1995 when interest rates in the secondary
market went up, while those in the primary market remained unchanged.
Yields for GKOs depend significantly (especially before 1997) on their
maturity, and yield/maturity relationship for different months are rela-
tively well described with logarithmic curves.
The development of the yields over time was quite similar for 3-month
and 6-month securities both in the primary and in the secondary mar-
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kets. This suggests that our analysis should be invariant with respect to
the choice of a particular indicator of the interest rate.
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4. GENERAL TRENDS IN FINANCIAL MARKET INDICATORS
The period from June 1994 to May 1998 was characterized by a high
degree of volatility in interest rates. Especially, this relates to the period
until July 1996. After that, we have observed a steadily decreasing trend
in interest rates, except for the recent developments connected to the
world financial crisis. We were able to distinguish 8 periods within the
entire time interval where various economic and political factors have
determined the specific trends in interest rates on government securi-
ties. The development of the macroeconomic indicators as well as major
underlying characteristics of the government economic policy and
regulations are presented below for each of the periods.
1. June 1994 – September 1994: Negative Real Interest Rates.
Yields for GKO are slightly declining, while inflation rate is growing. This
makes real interest rates more and more negative (–235% in Septem-
ber). Throughout the period borrowings are relatively high, and money
supply is growing. The exchange rate lags behind the inflation until July,
but then demand for dollars starts to increase. The CBR sells its re-
serves to restrain the exchange rate, the latter increases nevertheless in
September.
2. October 1994 – May 1995: "Black Tuesday" effect. The col-
lapse of the exchange rate market in October was followed by a hike of
interest rates in the government securities market up to 300%. From
that on we observe only positive real interest rates in the market, which
can make us consider the "black Tuesday" as a necessary correction to
market interest rates. It should be mentioned that the growth of inter-
bank rates was by far less marked.
The Government and the CBR (acting under the new Law on the Central
Bank prohibiting a direct monetary financing of the deficit) responded
with tight control over the fiscal and monetary policy, including cutting
down money supply and the volume of borrowings. As a result, the in-
flation and the exchange rate growth have been slowing down, and the
nominal interest rates returned to their pre-crisis level by April (though
with positive real level).
3. June 1995 – October 1995: "Exchange Rate Corridor". The
stabilization of the foreign currency rate was consolidated by the Central
Bank with the introduction of a managed exchange rate regime, i.e. the
"corridor" with relatively narrow announced band of variation. Actual
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exchange rate throughout the period was significantly lower than in April
and May.
A new hikes of interest rates in the interbank and GKO (up to 150 –
180%) markets occurred in August-September. The evident reason for
the former was a banking crisis caused by a risky policy of a number of
medium-level banks that have not managed to adjust to a new low-
inflation economy. The inter-bank market has collapsed (which was re-
flected in a jump in inter-bank rates), and then the securities market
also proved to be involved in the interest rates growth. As a result, GKO
interest rates have returned back to the level of the beginning of 1995,
and started to come down only when the liquidity in the inter-bank mar-
ket has been restored.
It look reasonable to suggest, that the crisis in the interbank market was
an immediate cause for the drop in the demand for GKO, as banks were
left without much money to invest in government securities.
4. November 1995 – December 1995: Peak in the Secondary
Market. The last two months of 1995 were the only ones when primary
and secondary GKO rates showed different development. While primary
GKO rates stayed relatively low (130%), secondary market rates fluctu-
ated at much higher levels (200%). Other macroeconomic indicators
were remaining stable, which made us to look for non-economic expla-
nations.
One can suggest that the GKO price drop in the secondary market was
caused by political factors: uncertainty on the eve of the parliament
elections. While the Government and the Central Bank kept the primary
market under control to maintain a tight budget and monetary policy,
the secondary market fluctuated under the pressure of political consid-
erations. As the election period ended, secondary market rates came
down to the level of the primary market.
5. January 1996 – March 1996: Early Stabilization. As the mone-
tary policy was tighter than ever supported by a type of "crawling peg"
system, inflation continued to slow down and have come to a level of
1% per month by the middle of 1996. Correspondingly, before the po-
litical pressures started to play a decisive role in financial decisions, in-
terest rates have decreased to 70% in February 1996. This reduction in
interest rates have been supported by a major increase in portfolio
capital inflow into GKO market, so that the demand for Russian govern-
ment securities increased substantially. The share of non-residents in
the GKO market (though mostly in the form of various "shadow"
schemes) has reached 15 – 20% by May 1995. However, political con-
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siderations related to the Presidential elections have started to play an
increasing role in the market and by March 1996 interest rate increased
again to 110%.
6. April 1996 – June 1996: The Price of the Presidential Elec-
tions. Growing since March, GKO yields peaked in May, reaching
258%. One reason was relatively high volume of net borrowings in
March – May, used to settle wage and pension arrears, promised by the
President. But uncertainty on the outcome of the forthcoming Presiden-
tial elections undoubtedly was more important. It has been used by ma-
jor players in the GKO market to increase the yields and get outstanding
profits. Mostly, this related to non-resident investment banks and hedge
funds that invested a lot in GKOs in the middle of 1996 on the basis of
the forecast that Yeltsin will win anyway, and money will return. At the
same time, Russian investors have put their money mostly into hard-
currency form which was reflected in a huge residential capital outflow.
As Yeltsin finally won and economic fundamentals remained positive (in-
cluding low inflation), this speculative market situation has ended right
after elections, and interest rates have returned back to the previous
magnitudes.
7. July 1996 – October 1997: Financial Stabilization Reached.
Interest rates were affected by two kinds of factors at this stage. First,
steady improvement of macroeconomic indicators resulted in lower in-
flation and exchange rate expectations. Second, the government secu-
rity market has been gradually integrated into the international financial
markets. This showed up in more easy access to the GKO markets for
non-residents, who held approximately 1/4 of the GKO in 1996. An im-
portant event was granting Russia international credit rating in October
1996 and the first issues of Russian Eurobonds in late 1996 and early
1997.
As a result, GKO interest rates have come down very quickly from 105%
in summer 1996 to 25% in May 1997. From May to October 1997, inter-
est rates have decreased further to the level of 16 – 17%. Those devel-
opments have been supported by very favorable conditions in the world
financial markets where investors expected the continuation of squeez-
ing the spreads between developed and emerging market instruments.
8. November 1997 – May 1998: External Shocks and Russian Fi-
nancial Crisis. Following the crisis in South East Asian financial mar-
kets, all major world financial markets became more volatile, and inves-
tors have started to look for safer investment opportunities. That has
already caused a substantial increase of the spreads between the de-
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veloped and emerging market instruments, and Russia has appeared to
be one of the victims. Interest rates increased again by up to 10 per-
centage points to 25 – 30%.
The wave of Asian financial crisis of the Fall 1997 has caused an insta-
bility in all emerging financial markets, particularly large in Russia.
Negative trends developed in both corporate and government security
markets. Already in the first days of crisis, the interest rates — both ex-
ternal and internal — increased by 3 – 5 percentage points, while stock
indices returned to the spring 1997 levels. The growth in domestic rates
has been suppressed by two factors. Firstly and most importantly, by
the CBR interventions aimed to support the government security market
as well as the exchange rate market. Secondly, by the restrictions on
capital flows which have still been in place in 1997.
Despite measures taken by the CBR to reduce liquidity (via the increase
in reserve requirements on hard-currency deposits and the attraction of
excess liquidity to interest-bearing deposits), and to increase the trust in
the exchange rate policy (via the announcement of a medium-term
strategy), the credibility crisis was not stopped, and hard-currency re-
serves of the CBR were rapidly falling. As a result, GKO/OFZ rates sub-
stantially exceeded the refinancing rate. The CBR was pushed to sup-
port the Ruble by a significant increase in interest rates.
The refinancing rate was increased to 28%, and the yields on govern-
ment securities stabilized at the level of 25 – 30%. The unstable equilib-
rium was supported by various forms of external borrowing. Neverthe-
less a speculative attack on the Ruble took place at the end of January
1998. Interest rates jumped well above the refinancing rate to the level
of 35 – 40%. The CBR was again forced to rely on a further increase in
its refinancing rate (up to 42%), to avoid a substantial capital flight from
the Russian market. After a short-lasted jump to 45 – 50%, the yields
fell to 35 – 40%, then to 30 – 35%, and finally to 24 – 28%. That gave
the CBR grounds to reduce the refinancing rate step by step to the level
of 30%. The reduction of GKO/OFZ rates was accelerated by an inflow
of non-resident capital supported by the abolishment of any restrictions
on the repatriation of profits from January 1, 1998. Further reduction of
interest rates was stopped by the Government reshuffle. As a result of
political uncertainty, the rates slowly increased reaching 30% by the
beginning of May 1998. In the middle of May, the abundance of nega-
tive news (both “Asian” and domestic) led to a new credibility crisis and
a new speculative attack on the Ruble. GKO/OFZ rates again jumped
above 40%. To defend the Ruble and stabilize financial markets, the
CBR increased the refinancing rate to 50%, and the yields stabilized at a
level of around 45 – 50%.
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5. DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL APPROPRIATENESS
5.1. MAJOR FACTORS UNDER INTEREST RATE TRENDS
Following the descriptive analysis, we have been able to identify major
factors under the general trends of interest rates on Russian govern-
ment securities observed from June 1994 to December 1997. Those
include: exchange rate developments and policy, political risks, the state
of the Russian banking sector, the degree of integration into the world
market, and the evaluation of government securities by the world finan-
cial market.
5.2. RELEVANCE OF THE MODEL
The basic model that was taken as a starting point of our analysis can
be described by the following system of equations (del Castillo (1991),
Juttner (1990)):
it = y q (i
*
t  + d
e
t ) + y (1 – q) it–1 + (1 – y) (rt + 
e
tp ) (1)
d et  = d[CAt, IRt, Mt, 
e
tp , 
a
td , Xt ] (2)
rt = r[Mt/Pt, BDt, Tt, Yt] (3)
e
tp  = p[Mt, Wt, pt–1, 
a
tp , d
e
t , Zt], (4)
where it is the nominal interest rate, i
*
i  — the dollar interest rate, d
e
t  —
expected depreciation of the domestic currency, rt — long-term real
interest rate, reflecting macroeconomic environment, etp  — expected
inflation, CAt — current account balance, IRt — official international re-
serves, BDt — budget deficit, Mt — money supply growth, 
a
tp  — ex-
pected inflation rate announced by the Government, atd  — announced
exchange rate depreciation, Pt — price level, Tt — composite effective
tax rate, Wt — wage growth, Xt, Yt, Zt — other factors, y — a parameter
reflecting the degree of integration of the domestic economy into the
world economy, q — a parameter reflecting the degree of financial mar-
kets efficiency.
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Our preliminary analysis described in the previous section provides a
good argument that this model is in fact relevant in the explanation of
interest rate developments in the Russian government security markets.
The Role of the integration into the world financial markets. The
model assumes that the more integrated the domestic economy is, and
the more efficient the financial markets are, the more rapidly will the
interest rate adjust to the interest parity condition (first brackets). If the
economy is relatively closed (y close to zero) and markets are not effi-
cient enough (q close to zero), the model predicts that the nominal in-
terest rate would follow the Fisher equation (second brackets).
We have found that before 1996 when the degree of integration of Rus-
sian financial markets into the world market was low (as measured by
the participation of non-resident investors in government security mar-
kets), the correlation between GKO yields and exchange rate adjusted
yields on MinFin bonds was close to zero (–0.09), while in 1996 and
1997 when the share of non-residents in GKO market fluctuated from 15
to 35 percent, the correlation was strong (0.80). In the period from Oc-
tober 1996 (when the Russian credit rating was announced and the first
Eurobonds were placed) until December 1997 the correlation was al-
most perfect (0.98).
The role of exchange rate expectations. The effect of exchange rate
expectations on interest rate developments has been itself a function of
the exchange rate policy conducted by the Central Bank. Before the
middle of 1995 when the first exchange rate band was announced, the
floating exchange rate played an almost deterministic role in interest
rate expectations as speculations in the exchange rate market served as
the only serious alternative for the government security market. The ex-
pectations of the exchange rate growth1 are substantially correlated with
corresponding GKO yields from May 1994 until May 1995 (0.57). This
suggests both a direct effect of the exchange rate expectations (when
currency is an alternative to GKO for investors), and an indirect effect
via inflationary expectations. Our model implies that the exchange rate
expectations are reflected in inflationary expectations that in turn affect
nominal interest rates.
After the announcement of the exchange rate band, the direct effect
has gradually disappeared, and from 1996 the exchange rate expecta-
                                               
1 We used the adaptive form of expectations rather than the exchange rate fu-
tures as the data on the latter are still not complete.
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tions affect interest rates via the interest rate parity as the weight of the
latter increased significantly from the beginning of 1996. This conclusion
is supported both by the insignificant correlation between the exchange
rate expectations from June 1995 to September 1997 (–0.07), and by
the high correlation between GKO and MinFin bond yields.
5.3. INTERPRETATION OF THE INTEREST RATES DEVELOPMENT
IN TERMS OF THE MODEL
The considerations about the role of integration and exchange rate ex-
pectations suggest that the model of interest rate determination (1) –
(4) is indeed relevant and reasonable. On the one hand, it provides
qualitative explanation of interest rate fluctuations over the entire period
and over the two major sub-periods divided by a structural break in the
middle of 1995.
Before June 1995, under unstable exchange rate expectations, bigger
weight can be attributed in the model to the influence of internal factors.
The latter is reflected by the second and the third part of Equation (1),
and Equation (4), where inflationary expectations are a function of ex-
change rate expectations.
After June 1995, especially from the beginning of 1996, the model
places most of the weight on external factors reflected in world interest
rates adjusted with stable exchange expectations. This relationship is
built into the model as the first part of Equation (1), and Equation (2),
where exchange rate expectations are related to the announced ex-
change rate regime.
Our analysis shows that the model should incorporate the estimation of
political risks that played a decisive role in the determination of interest
rates during election campaigns. Our model will include this risks as the
variable Y(t) in Equation (3). Political risks raise a risk premium that
should be incorporated into the real interest rate, and may as well affect
the risk premium included into the dollar interest rate i *t .
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6. THE MODEL SPECIFICATION
We have given up estimation of inflation expectations and real interest
rates, which appear in the initial model. It was decided to replace the
term (rt + 
e
tp ) with the nominal rate Rt, taking as Rt some interest rate,
depending on “domestic” macroeconomic variables (like inflation,
money supply, budget deficit, etc).
One of the key issues was the choice of a particular rate for use as an
indicator Rt.  Several options were tried: the Central Bank refinancing
rate RCBR, the interbank overnight rate RIB, and average deposit rate
RDEP. Each of them has its own salient features, affecting its possible
role in the model. The RCBR depends to some extent on both macro-
economic variables and other interest rates, but it is essentially a vari-
able controlled by the monetary authorities. In this case Rt may be con-
sidered as an exogenous variable, set outside the model. Such version
of the model is important from the viewpoint of possible implications of
the Central Bank policy. A recent situation when this issue was of crucial
interest is the period of the financial markets turmoil, when the CBR had
to manipulate the refinancing rate, exchange rates and the GKO interest
rates.
The major features of the interest rates under consideration are as fol-
lows:
The Central Bank refinancing rate
· controlled by the CBR, so it can be used as a policy instrument;
· relatively stable most of the time as compared to other rates; but it
can experience significant abrupt changes;
· specific relationship with GKO/OFZ rate (say, RCBR cannot be
sustainably kept at a lower level than the GKO/OFZ rate), putting
limitations on its use as a policy instrument.
Interbank overnight rate
· high volatility;
· dependence on the major macroeconomic factors: short-term
money demand and supply, state of the banking sector, etc;
· only implicit interdependence with the GKO/OFZ rate;
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· "objective" nature, as it is defined on the highly competitive mar-
ket.
Deposit rate
· medium-size stability;
· linked to such macroeconomic factors as demand for money and
supply of savings;
· a high correlation with GKO/OFZ rates, as the government security
market is one of the main directions of investment.
The initial presentation of the model (1) – (4) incorporates the product
of the key parameters, q and y. But the model can be modified to "un-
tie" this product making its construction easier. The first equation of the
model was subsequently represented as:
it = j1 (i
*
t  + d
e
t ) + j2 it–1 + j3 Rt
Parameters j1 to j3 characterize respectively the impact of
“international” interest rates, inertia in interest rates formation, and do-
mestic macroeconomic situation. In fact, if we suppose that j1 + j2 +
j3 = 1, this is equivalent to the initial equation, with q = j1/(j1 + j2),
and y = j1 + j2. Having estimated parameters j1 – j3, we can thus
obtain the measures of "market efficiency" and "market integration".
Moreover, parameters j1 – j3 have by themselves even better interpre-
tation than y and q, as contribution of each of the three components is
characterized with its own parameter.
Whatever is the choice of the interest rate Rt, it is essential to take into
account its bilateral link to the GKO rate it. To reflect this, a system of
simultaneous equations was estimated that included four endogenous
variables:
it   — GKO/OFZ auction interest rate,
i *t   — interest rates on Minfin bonds (denominated in USD), adjusted to
the 6-month maturity,
d et  — expectations of the USD exchange rate in 6 month (translated into
annual exchange rate growth),
Rt — one of the domestic interest rates.
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The choice of i *t  changes somewhat the underlying interpretation of the
model. The first component in the Equation (1) in the modified version is
not just “international interest rate”, but rather “interest rate of Russian
securities in international markets”. It incorporates thus both interna-
tional interest rates (Tt) and international estimates of specific risks st
associated to Russian securities.
The equations have been constructed in the following form:
it = j1 (i
*
t  + d
e
t ) + j2 it–1 + (1 – j1 – j2) Rt + c13D1 + c14D2 +
+ c15D3,
Rt = r[Rt–1, it (it–1), 
a
tp , 
a
td , MSt, Bt],
i *t  = Tt + s[i
*
-1t , Rt, 
a
tp , 
a
td , IRt],
d et  = d[MSt, 
a
tp , 
a
td , 
e
1t-d , IRt],
where D1, D2, D3 are dummies, allowing for the effect of the Presiden-
tial elections: D1 = 1 in the first months of the pre-elections period
(March – April 1996) and 0 otherwise, D2 = 1 in the point of maximum
political risk in June 1996, D3 = 1 in July 1996, when the rates returned
to their normal levels (the necessity to incorporate the latter variable is
caused by the use of lagged variable it–1 in the first equation),
MSt — some indicator of money supply. Several variables were tried as
such indicator: real M2 value (M2 deflated by CPI); money supply
growth rates (average for the last 3 or 6 months), without lag or lagged
for 1 to 3 months; real money base; money base growth rate (averaged
and lagged in the same way as M2),
Bt — some indicator of actual or potential scale of domestic borrowings.
Again several variables were tried for this role, including: Federal budget
deficit, real volume of GKO/OFZ placement; real receipts from placing
GKO/OFZ; real net financing via GKO/OFZ market (in all cases “real”
meant “deflated by CPI” or “expressed in % of GDP”);
Tt — interest rate for the US 6-month treasury bills,
IRt — gross international reserves of Russia (in USD billion),
r, s, d — linear functions characterizing correspondingly dependence of
the "domestic" interest rate Rt, spread, and expected ex-
change rate growth on the factors defining them.
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One of the hypotheses was that the measures of market "integration",
"inertia", and "macroeconomic dependency" are changing with time. To
test it, in addition to the models where coefficients c11 – c13 were con-
stant, models with variable coefficients of the form: a + b*t, a + b*log(t),
a + b/t.
The observations comprised 28 months (July 1995 to October 1997).
The choice of the initial point is explained by the structural break re-
vealed in the previous analysis since the introduction of the exchange
rate corridor, while the end point was chosen basing on the stationarity
analysis. Augmented Dickey – Fuller unit root test initially implemented
for the period July 1995 – December 1997 failed to reject null hypothe-
sis of non-stationarity for the series i *t . Applied for the truncated period
July 1995 – October 1997, this test made possible to reject non-
stationarity for all endogenous variables. The necessity to cut the last
two months of 1997 looks natural as they date to the period of world
financial crisis.
The system was estimated by the two-stage least squares procedure.
The following model specification proved to be the best:
it = c11ln(t) (i
*
t  + d
e
t ) + c12 it–1 + (1 – c11 ln(t) – c12) RCBRt +
 + c13 D1 +c14 D2 + c15 D3, (5)
RCBRt = c21RCBRt–1 + c22 it + c23 
a
tp  + c24 
a
td  + c25 borrt, (6)
i *t  = Tt + c31 i
*
-1t  + c32 RCBRt , (7)
d et  = c41 
e
1t-d  + c42 
a
tp  + c43 IRt, (8)
Table 1.
Augmented Dickey – Fuller Test.
ADF Test Critical value Significance level, %
it 4.41 4.32 1
RCBRt 2.44 1.95 5
*
ti 4.37 4.34 1
e
td 2.05 1.95 5
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where "borr" denotes GKO/OFZ placement at constant prices (i.e. de-
flated by CPI), while IR and RCBR, as mentioned above, are the interna-
tional reserves and CBR refinancing rate correspondingly.
This system meets rank conditions of identification.
Significant serial correlation was revealed for the i *t  variable. To deal
with it the moving average technique was used, which eliminated auto-
correlation.
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7. THE MODEL ESTIMATION
The output for each equation estimation is presented below.
Equation 1.
it = 0.0689 ln(t) (i
*
t  + d
e
t ) + 0.789 it–1 +
                (t = 2.5)        (t = 10.5)
+ (1 – 0.0689 ln(t) – 0.789) RCBRt + 0.627 D1 + 1.026 D2 – 0.838 D3
          (t = 5.3)      (t = 6.4)     (t = 4.8)
R2adj = 0.957, F = 127.9, s = 0.145, DW = 1.56, Durbin h = 1.16.
Residual Tests. Normality of residuals is rejected at 5% level (Jarque –
Bera test = 9.16).
The hypothesis of no serial correlation is not rejected by either Ljung –
Box or Breush – Godfrey tests:
Lag Autocor.  Partial  Q-Stat. Prob.
autocor.
   1   0.157   0.157   0.667  0.41
   2 –0.254 –0.286   2.496  0.29
   3 –0.109 –0.015   2.852  0.42
   4   0.019 –0.032   2.864  0.58
   5 –0.125 –0.177   3.380  0.64
   6 –0.223 –0.198   5.102  0.53
   7 –0.044 –0.066   5.173  0.64
   8   0.085 –0.047   5.454  0.71
   9   0.166   0.105   6.594  0.68
 10   0.141   0.097   7.481  0.68
 11 –0.108 –0.153   8.040  0.71
 12 –0.091 –0.025   8.473  0.75
Lag LM-stat. Prob.
 1   0.95 0.33
 2   3.23 0.20
 3   3.35 0.34
 4   3.78 0.44
 5   6.14 0.29
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White's Test does not reject homoskedasticity ( *obsN R2 = 13.8, Prob.=
0.39).
Equation 2.
RCBRt = 0.874 RCBRt–1 + 0.130 it + 0.358 
a
tp  – 2.286 
a
td  +
        (t = 18.4)        (t = 6.4)    (t = 3.2)    (t = –3.8)
+ 7.759×10–6 borrt
            (t = 2.9)
R2adj = 0.995, F = 1208.3, s = 0.040, DW = 2.31, Durbin h = –0.80.
Residual Tests. Normality of residuals is not rejected (Jarque–Bera
test = 0.71).
The hypothesis of no serial correlation is not rejected by either Ljung–
Box or Breush–Godfrey tests:
Lag  Autocor.  Partial  Q-Stat Prob
autocor.
   1 –0.099 –0.099    0.278  0.60
   2 –0.205 –0.217    1.508  0.47
   3   0.295   0.264    4.186  0.24
   4 –0.075 –0.077    4.365  0.36
   5 –0.427 –0.374  10.518  0.06
   6   0.082 –0.089  10.760  0.10
   7   0.011 –0.093  10.764  0.15
   8 –0.181 –0.009  12.065  0.15
   9 –0.077 –0.226  12.313  0.20
 10   0.043 –0.219  12.398  0.26
 11   0.140   0.153  13.346  0.27
 12 –0.152 –0.203  14.552  0.27
Lag   LM-stat. Prob.
 1 0.25 0.62
 2 1.59 0.45
 3 3.31 0.35
 4 3.51 0.48
 5 7.51 0.19
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White's Test does not reject homoskedasticity ( *obsN R2 = 12.6, Prob.=
0.25).
Equation 3.
i *t  = Tt + 0.225 i
*
-1t  + 0.0535 RCBRt ,
(t = 6.9)     (t = 14.1)
MA(1) = 0.338,
R2adj = 0.968, F = 415.3, s = 0.007, DW = 2.06, Durbin h = –0.15.
Residual Tests. Normality of residuals is not rejected (Jarque – Bera
test = 0.61).
The hypothesis of no serial correlation is not rejected by either Ljung –
Box or Breush – Godfrey tests:
Lag Autocor.  Partial  Q-Stat  Prob
autocor.
   1 –0.029 –0.029   0.027  0.99
   2 –0.101 –0.101   0.354  0.55
   3 –0.116 –0.124   0.805  0.67
   4 –0.234 –0.260   2.720  0.44
   5 –0.036 –0.100   2.768  0.60
   6 –0.035 –0.134   2.814  0.73
   7   0.109   0.011   3.288  0.77
   8 –0.068 –0.182   3.480  0.84
   9   0.124   0.072   4.159  0.84
 10   0.021 –0.032   4.180  0.90
 11 –0.053 –0.031   4.320  0.93
 12 –0.013 –0.055   4.328  0.96
Lag LM-stat. Prob.
 1   0.22 0.64
 2   0.37 0.83
 3   2.40 0.49
 4   2.91 0.57
 5   3.69 0.59
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White's Test does not reject homoskedasticity ( *obsN R2 = 4.93, Prob. =
0.29).
Equation 4.
d et  = 1.189 
e
1t-d  + 0.568 
a
tp  – 0.00467 IRt,
     (t = 4.6)   (t = 9.2)     (t = –3.3)
R2adj = 0.870, F = 87.6, s = 0.047, DW = 1.80.
Residual Tests. Normality of residuals is not rejected (Jarque–Bera
test = 0.61).
The hypothesis of no serial correlation is not rejected by either Ljung–
Box or Breush–Godfrey tests:
Lag Autocor.  Partial Q-Stat. Prob.
autocor.
   1   0.058   0.058  0.102  0.75
   2   0.211   0.208  1.495  0.47
   3 –0.063 –0.089  1.625  0.65
   4   0.036   0.001  1.670  0.80
   5 –0.301 –0.287  4.905  0.43
   6 –0.196 –0.199  6.337  0.39
   7 –0.196 –0.075  7.841  0.35
   8 –0.152 –0.122  8.790  0.36
   9 –0.161 –0.131  9.918  0.36
 10   0.006 –0.038  9.919  0.45
 11   0.015 –0.070  9.930  0.54
 12 –0.027 –0.179  9.967  0.62
Lag      LM-stat.      Prob.
 1        0.09      0.76
 2        1.35      0.51
 3        1.51      0.68
 4        1.52      0.82
 5        3.81      0.58
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White's Test does not reject homoskedasticity ( *obsN R2 = 10.22, Prob. =
0.12).
Terms constant, increasing or decreasing with time were tried for coef-
ficients j1 – j3. The best estimates were obtained when we used in-
creasing (with diminishing rate) "market integration degree" j1, con-
stant "degree of inertia" j2, and correspondingly decreasing "macro-
economic dependence" j3. Calculated figures of these parameters as
well as that for the parameters q, y from the initial model (1) – (4) are
presented below for the whole period under consideration.
The calculated parameters imply that the degree of market inertia was
constant at the level of 79%. A high level of market inertia could have
been expected, given a relatively small volatility of interest rates in the
period under consideration (correlation of the current to previous inter-
est rate made up 0.87). The "market integration" was increasing from 0
to 23% in October 1997, while macroeconomic dependency was de-
clining from 21% in July 1995 to 0 in April 1997, and became even
negative by October 1997. The latter fact from our viewpoint does not
deserve special discussion, as the parameter's magnitude doesn't differ
significantly from zero. Increasing degree of market integration corre-
sponds to a growing involvement of non-residents in Russian securities
markets. During 1997, the share of GKO/OFZ holdings by non-residents
increased from 17 to 28%.
In terms of the initial model, the "market integration" degree q is grow-
ing from 0 to 23%, while the "market efficiency" is increasing from 79 to
100% plus.
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Table 2.
Estimated Parameters of the Interest Rate Performance.
j1 j2 j3 q, % y, %
Jul-95 0.000 0.789 0.211 0 79
Aug-95 0.048 0.789 0.163 6 84
Sep-95 0.076 0.789 0.136 9 86
Oct-95 0.096 0.789 0.116 11 88
Nov-95 0.111 0.789 0.100 12 90
Dec-95 0.124 0.789 0.088 14 91
Jan-96 0.134 0.789 0.077 15 92
Feb-96 0.143 0.789 0.068 15 93
Mar-96 0.151 0.789 0.060 16 94
Apr-96 0.159 0.789 0.053 17 95
May-96 0.165 0.789 0.046 17 95
Jun-96 0.171 0.789 0.040 18 96
Jul-96 0.177 0.789 0.034 18 97
Aug-96 0.182 0.789 0.029 19 97
Sep-96 0.187 0.789 0.025 19 98
Oct-96 0.191 0.789 0.020 20 98
Nov-96 0.195 0.789 0.016 20 98
Dec-96 0.199 0.789 0.012 20 99
Jan-97 0.203 0.789 0.008 20 99
Feb-97 0.207 0.789 0.005 21 100
Mar-97 0.210 0.789 0.001 21 100
Apr-97 0.213 0.789 –0.002 21 100
May-97 0.216 0.789 –0.005 22 100
Jun-97 0.219 0.789 –0.008 22 101
Jul-97 0.222 0.789 –0.011 22 101
Aug-97 0.225 0.789 –0.013 22 101
Sep-97 0.227 0.789 –0.016 22 102
Oct-97 0.230 0.789 –0.018 23 102
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8. THE MODEL'S SIMULATION
To check roughly the quality of the model a dynamic simulation was im-
plemented.
The first step was historical simulation for the period July 1995 – Octo-
ber 1997.
Observed and fitted endogenous variables are presented at the
Fig.4 – 7. Their comparison demonstrates relatively good match in the
recent period.
The accuracy of the simulation can be characterized with the figures in
Table 3.
Our model enables an evaluation of the impact of the market integration
with the world financial markets. This was carried out by comparing the
results of the above ex post simulation with similar results under an as-
sumption of constant coefficients j1 – j3. It was found that in the latter
case the GKO interest rate would decrease from 165.8% in October
1995 to 117.2% in October 1997. Under changing coefficients the Oc-
tober 1997 simulated rate amounts to 17.0%, while the observed rate
was 17.5%. This can have an interpretation that with a constant market
integration the interest rate decline would have been only 33% of its
actual fall. The remaining 67% of the interest rate decrease should be
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attributed then to a change in the market integration. This conclusion
confirms thus the widespread view that the reason for interest rates de-
crease was, first of all, participation of non-residents in the market, and
we give it a quantitative estimation.
200
150
100
50
0
Fitted
Observed
7.95    10.95    1.96    4.96     7.96   10.96    1.97    4.97     7.97   10.97
Fig. 5. Observed and Fitted GBR Refinancing Rate.
percent
Fitted
Observed
30
20
10
0
7.95    10.95    1.96    4.96     7.96    10.96    1.97    4.97     7.97   10.97
Fig. 6. Observed and Fitted MinFin Bonds Interest Rate.
percent
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The conclusion from the model that may seem unexpected is that since
mid-1997 the “domestic” interest rate, reflecting macroeconomic situa-
tion, did not affect the GKO rates directly, as j3 fell to zero. In terms of
economic theory this result implies that Russia became by this time a
“small open economy”. Analysis of the GKO market at the micro-level
supports the viewpoint that non-residents were dominating this market.
Though they hold under 30% of the securities, non-residents managed
to manipulate the whole market, by “signaling” the intention to leave it.
According to the model, macroeconomic conditions still influenced the
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Fig. 7. Observed and Fitted Expected ER Growth (next 6 mnth in annual
terms).
percent
Table 3.
Summary Statistics for Historical Simulation (July 1995 – October 1997).
GKO Rate
%),i( t
CBR Rate
(RCBR, %)
Currency
Securities Rate
%),i( t
*
Exchange Rate
Expectations
%),( etd
RMS error  18.0  15.4   1.4 4.4
RMS % error  18.8  17.6   9.4 23.5
Simulation
error
–2.9 –8.5 –0.5 0.0
Simulation %
error
  4.1 –2.6 –2.6 2.9
Theil U   8.1   7.4   5.1 9.6
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GKO rates in 1997, but only through the currency rate i* and the ex-
change rate expectations e 1t-d .
The next step in our analysis is an ex post forecast for the period No-
vember 1997 – June 1998. The projected GKO interest rates (see
Figs 8 – 11), amount to 11% in June. This complies entirely with the
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Fig. 8. Observed and Simulated ex post GKO Interest Rate.
percent
Simulated
Observed
80
10.97   11.97    12.97     1.98       2.98      3.98      4.98       5.98     6.98
Fig. 9. Observed and Simulated ex post CBR Refinancing Rate.
60
40
20
0
percent
8. THE MODEL'S SIMULATION 37
government forecast used in the Federal Budget for 1998, but evidently
differs drastically from the actual rates in June, which made up 51% for
the 6-months GKO.
We have to conclude thus that our model provides satisfactory descrip-
tion for the interest rates development before the financial crisis, but
fails to explain market performance after crisis initiation.
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9. THE MODEL DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION
Our simultaneous equations account for the inter-relation among various
internal and external interest rates. The refinancing rate (as a base do-
mestic rate) fulfills the role of a connection between external and do-
mestic yields on government securities. The external rate has two com-
ponents: the base 6-month US Treasury rate and the spread reflecting a
country risk. It is assumed that this spread is also included in the refi-
nancing rate, which is endogenous in our model.
Most of the estimated coefficients have the right signs and do not re-
quire special discussion. The main exception is the negative sign of the
coefficient for the officially expected exchange rate growth in the equa-
tion for the refinance rate. We can suggest the following explanation.
Given low credibility of its announced policy, the Central Bank had to
use higher refinancing rate to support any projected reduction of ex-
change rate devaluation. The Central Bank changes ex ante its refi-
nance rate in accordance with announced exchange rate policy, while
market rates develop mostly following market's own exchange rate ex-
pectations. If the latter differs substantially from the former, the Central
Bank may be forced to change ex post its refinance rate in the opposite
direction to affect the market sentiment and persuade the market that
the CBR will stick to the announced policy. We found negative correla-
tion between the refinance rate and the difference between the an-
nounced and the expected future exchange rates, while the refinance
rate was positively correlated with both announced and expected rates
separately.
The assumption that the sum of coefficients in the main interest rate
equation is equal to one is justified by the significance of this equation,
and by the fact that in most regression runs without this assumption, the
unitary hypothesis could not be rejected. That implies that the external
and internal factors in the equation are substitutes, while being corre-
lated each with the other. The relative influence of two classes of factors
changes over time in opposite directions: the role of the external rate
has gone up implying a gradual increase in the degree of market
“integration”, while the role of the domestic rate (“macroeconomic de-
pendence”) has diminished. The degree of integration of the Russian
market into the world financial system went up from “zero” in the middle
in 1995 to around 23% at the end of 1997.
The “inertia” coefficient entered the model as a constant with a relatively
high value of around 0.79, implying a constantly large inertia in interest
rate changes.
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Negative values of the coefficients for the refinancing rate from the sec-
ond half of 1997 is the result of a negative influence of domestic factors
on GKO/OFZ yields. The model indicates that the influence of the refi-
nancing rate is channeled through the trust of investors. If investors be-
lieve that an increase in the refinancing rate was required and justified,
the capital would flow into the market and GKO/OFZ rates would de-
crease. However, if investors think that a reduction in the refinancing
rate was premature, this can cause an outflow of capital and an in-
crease in GKO/OFZ rates.
It is crucial to discuss why the model fails to produce an accurate ex
post forecast for the H1 1998 development.  The major source of dis-
crepancy was the projected magnitude of the expected exchange rate.
Actual futures quotations envisaged in June a 32% devaluation on annu-
alized basis (and even more — over 50% in the Chicago Stock Ex-
change), while the model predicts devaluation as low as 5.4% — quite
close to the announced exchange rate devaluation (5%). This error is
also responsible, to a great extent, for the forecast errors of other indi-
cators.
The sharp rise of the expected exchange rate can be attributed to sev-
eral factors, which are not reflected in the model. First, world prices for
the major commodities exported by Russia dropped in the fourth quarter
of 1997 and the first half of 1998. This persuaded most investors that
the ruble became an overvalued currency, and hence its devaluation
should be expected shortly.  Our estimates suggest that the ruble was
still somewhat undervalued at that time, if measured by the purchasing
power parity level.
Second, the Asian financial crisis and subsequent devaluation of some
currencies in Asia aroused investors' cautiousness towards all emerging
markets, but especially the Russian one, due to slow pace of structural
reforms and rapid growth of government short-term external debt.
These sentiments were absent and did not influence capital inflows
during the previous year. The major difference was a lower servicing
load on both government and private debts in 1997, and this difference
is not reflected in the model. Third, political instability hindered imple-
mentation of the reforms that could have stabilized the economy.
As a result, international reserves of the CBR were depleting rapidly, in
spite of extensive new foreign borrowing. Reserves were also contract-
ing in response to increasing inability of the Government to raise tax
revenues and the evidence of continuing high capital flight.
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One of the factors mentioned above is incorporated in the model: equa-
tion for currency expectations does include the level of international re-
serves. The actually observed decrease of international reserves in 1998
only insignificantly affects our projected interest rates. The reason is
that the macro-economic situation was improving in the base period of
the model estimation, but was deteriorating in the forecast period. In
particular, international reserves and the government debt were in
1995 – 1997 less significant by far than in 1998.
Another point is that the situation at the new stage was characterized by
lack of confidence to the monetary authorities policy, resulting in quite
different interpretation of the announced macroeconomic targets. This
changes entirely investors attitudes and behavior. Say, if investors be-
lieve the announced targets are reasonable, their expectations are posi-
tively correlated to them. In case of lack of confidence, this correlation
is likely to be negative, as from the viewpoint of investors, say, unrealis-
tic exchange rate targets make devaluation more probable. "Credibility
crisis" was caused, on one hand, by inability of the Government to re-
spond adequately to the challenge of the deteriorated financial condi-
tions, and on the other hand, by lack of flexibility of the monetary
authorities, which were reluctant to adjust their targets and policies with
regard to the changed environment.
We believe that models of the type used in our study are able to provide
reasonable description of the interest rates only when expectations do
not differ much from the announced targets. Otherwise one should build
model of different type, accounting for the effect of "objective" factors
on investors' sentiments. The evident policy implications is that the
authorities have to pay much more attention to the intended or unin-
tended signals sent to investors, and make efforts to send only confi-
dent signals.
The major reasons for unsatisfactory ex post forecasts provided by the
model were thus global changes of investment environment and failure
to account for some important macroeconomic parameters in the equa-
tion for currency expectations.
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Possible way of applying the interest rate model to evaluate fiscal policy
scenarios is considered below. This model was incorporated to the
broader framework to forecast domestic debt developments. At the
same time it enabled ex ante projections of the interest rates.
10.1. DOMESTIC PUBLIC DEBT: OVERVIEW
At the end of 1997, Russia's total outstanding domestic public debt
amounted to 606.9 trillion Rubles (USD 101.6 billion), or 22.7% of GDP.
This public debt comprised domestic debt of the Government amounting
to 556.0 trillion Rubles, debt of the sub-federal local governments of
37.7 trillion Rubles and 3.2 trillion Rubles owed by the State Pension
Fund. Total Government domestic debt service payments increased
from 1.1% of GDP in 1992 to 4.7% of GDP in 1996 and declined to
3.5% of GDP in 1997.
Domestic indebtedness of the Government consists of state treasury
bills (“GKOs”, from May 1993), Federal Loan Bonds (“OFZs”, from June
1995), ruble-denominated saving bonds (“OGSZs”, from September
1995) for retail investors with coupon yields tied to OFZ rates, internal
Government hard-currency bonds (“OVVZs” known as “Taiga” bonds or
“MinFins”, from 1992) and securitized arrears on centralized credits to
the agricultural sector and Northern regions of 1992 – 1995, as well as
various smaller items.
Foreign investor access to the market for Russia's Government securi-
ties was significantly liberalized over the course of 1997, all restrictions
on repatriation of profits from operations with GKOs and OFZs were
eliminated as of 1 January 1998. The only remaining limitation on the
access of foreign investors to the market is the requirement that non-
residents trade in the securities through special “S” accounts with
authorized banks. Currently, non-residents hold approximately 30% of
all GKO/OFZ stock by face value.
Russia's Government domestic debt policies were significantly affected
by developments associated with the financial crisis in Asia at the end of
1997. As difficulties intensified, GKO/OFZ yields rose appreciably, re-
sulting in a projected increase in domestic debt service payments for
1998 of approximately 0.9% of GDP. In response, the Government cur-
tailed new GKO/OFZ issuance to the rollover of existing obligations. At
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that time the Government issued securities with shorter maturities,
which caused the weighted average maturity to decrease from 9 months
at 31 October 1997 to only 8 months at 1 January 1998. Early in 1998,
the Government announced its intention to continue to limit GKO/OFZ
issuance until interest rates and maturities available in the domestic
debt market returned to normal levels.
10.2. MODEL FOR DOMESTIC DEBT PROJECTION
The broad framework included in addition to the Equations (5) – (8) the
following relationships:
a) Receipts Nt to the federal budget from the GKO/OFZ placement is
calculated as sum of the necessary net financing Ft and required re-
demption Rt (which is defined by the earlier borrowings):
Nt = Ft + Rt,
b) Volume Zt of the GKO/OFZ placement depends on the receipts Nt
and GKO interest rate it:
Zt = N
*
t  (1 + it),
We identify here 6-months interest rates it estimated in the model with
the average GKO/OFZ rates. The reason is that throughout 1997 rates
for 6-months and 12-months securities were quite close, so no adjust-
ment was required.
c) Borrowings at constant prices are evaluated assuming that actual
inflation is the same as the announced one:
borrt = Zt/
a
tp .
Amount of borrowing was calculated then together with the interest
rates from the enlarged system, including equations (5)–(8) and the re-
lations presented in a)–c).
d) Redemption due at the moment (t + t) in future was calculated as:
Rt+t = Zt,
Here we simplified the task, assuming for simulation purposes that all
government securities have standard maturity t, and thus leaving apart
their dispersion around this level.
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e) GKO/OFZ outstanding debt Dt, defined as debt stock at the previous
step plus the difference of the issued (Zt) and redeemed (Rt) securities:
Dt = Dt + Zt – Rt .
10.3. ASSUMPTIONS AND PROJECTIONS
A dynamic simulation was carried out for the period July – December
1998.
We suggested that the formation of the government securities market in
Russia is close to completion, therefore assumed that parameters j1 to
j3  in the Equation (5) can be taken constant for the end 1997 and
1998, at their level of October 1997.
To check whether our model implies logical results, we have conducted
a number of model experiments related to a forecast of interest rates in
1998 under a certain economic policy scenario. The forecast assump-
tions included:
· the announced inflation of 7% for 1998 and 5.5% in 1999,
· the announced policy of a stable real exchange rate,
· a stable 6-month US Treasury rate of 5.2% (as at the end of 1997)
for the whole period,
· volumes of net supplies of GKO/OFZ paper as planned by the Fed-
eral budget. The latter were calculated basing on the projected
budget revenues and expenditure, and other sources of financing,
· scheduled volumes of government securities redemption.
The assumed specific figures are presented in the Table 4.
The projected figures of the model variables are presented in the Table
5, while borrowings and domestic debt developments are given in the
Table 6.
Thus estimated GKO/OFZ outstanding debt for the end 1998 amounted
to 525.4 Ruble billion, and its expected growth in 1998 made up 20.5%,
and the growth in H2 1998 was estimated at 13.1%.
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Table 4.
The Major Characteristics of the Scenario for 2H1998 (Ruble
Billion).
Redemption Net financing
Jul-98 38.24 0.65
Aug-98 27.37 1.46
Sep-98 35.11 0.89
Oct-98 29.45 0.58
Nov-98 30.27 0.77
Dec-98 18.35 0.50
Table 5.
Projected Values of the Model Endogenous Variables for the
1998.
it, % RCBR, % i*, % de, %
Jul-98 42.7 71.9 13.1 2.4
Aug-98 35.3 66.7 11.6 0.9
Sep-98 30.0 62.8 11.0 3.5
Oct-98 25.7 57.1 10.6 2.9
Nov-98 22.2 51.8 10.2 2.4
Dec-98 19.4 44.0 9.7 2.1
Table 6.
Projected Value of the GKO/OFZ Placement and Their Outstan-
ding Value (Ruble Billion).
GKO/OFZ
placement
GKO/OFZ
outstanding debt
Jul-98 55.5 481.9
Aug-98 39.0 493.6
Sep-98 46.8 505.3
Oct-98 37.8 513.6
Nov-98 37.9 521.2
Dec-98 22.5 525.4
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The resulted forecast of GKO/OFZ rates seems to be reasonable from a
qualitative point of view. The forecast that we obtained is very close to
the Government's end-1998 target to reduce the average GKO/OFZ rate
to 16%. Nevertheless, the events of the last months indicate that such
forecast was over-optimistic.
The model implies that reductions of the refinancing rate had to be
more gradual than those implemented by the Central Bank. The CBR
has reduced the spread between the refinancing rate and the GKO rate
to 5 percentage points by the middle of March 1998, while the model
indicated that the spread had to be raised above 10% before the CBR
could start to reduce it. As the Central Bank quickly reduced its refi-
nancing rate, GKO/OFZ rates had to go up according to our model (as
the weight coefficient is negative), which, in turn, was to push up the
refinancing rate and gradually stabilize GKO/OFZ rates. This automatic
stabilizing mechanism represents one of the main features of our model.
Thus, one of the first recommendations we can infer from our model is
the necessity of a more careful approach to the reduction of the refi-
nancing rate by the Central Bank. The reduction in the rate is well
grounded only after a sufficiently long downward trend in GKO/OFZ
yields, and — even better — after a substantial permanent reduction in
the level of borrowing.
One can argue that the model involves an internal contradiction between
the role of the refinancing rate as a policy instrument and its endogenu-
ity. However, in our opinion, this seeming contradiction reflects a real
world trade-off between using the refinancing rate as a leading signal
and adjusting it to the market. The refinancing rate can be used as a
market signal only if the Central Bank policy is highly credible. Other-
wise, the Central Bank is bound to follow the market.
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